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FINANCIAL STABILITy CoNSEQuENCES oF THE EXpECTED CREDIT LoSS MoDEL  
IN IFRS 9 
 
following the G20 mandate, there has been a move from incurred loss approaches for the 
recognition of credit losses to expected credit loss approaches. since 1 January 2018, 
european banks follow the approach defined by ifrs 9, according to which, exposures 
are allocated to three stages depending on their relative credit risk. these stages require 
different time horizons for the computation of expected credit losses and different basis 
for interest accrual. overall, the timelier and fuller recognition of credit losses is expected 
to bring substantial benefits to financial stability. However, ifrs 9 is not going to be applied 
with perfect foresight. on the contrary, expected credit loss models would be able to 
anticipate downturns only shortly before their occurrence. at the onset, a system-wide 
sizable increase in provisions associated with expected credit losses can be expected, 
which may have undesired procyclical effects via banks’ profits and regulatory capital. the 
paradigm shift in accounting for credit losses may call for a policy reflection on: i) the 
importance of supervisory stress tests; ii) a call for simplicity in models; iii) the need for 
better and harmonised disclosures; iv) the expectations on the use of cyclical capital 
buffers, and v) the interaction with the current regulatory framework. 
the approach to the accounting treatment of credit losses is of utmost importance for 
banks, in particular in times of a crisis, given its sizable impact in the profit or loss account 
and, subsequently, in regulatory capital ratios. for long time, accounting standard setters 
have been struggling to find the most appropriate approach to the accounting of credit 
losses, in a way that accurately and faithfully reflects the dynamics of the cycle. the two 
main approaches are based on the concepts of incurred losses and of expected credit 
losses. under the first one, only realised credit losses, on the basis of a realised (or highly 
likely) default event, are recognised. expected credit loss approaches, on the contrary, aim 
at anticipating the credit losses to arise in the future and over which banks have a certain 
degree of certainty on their occurrence.
prior to the global financial crisis, the incurred loss approach for the computation of credit 
losses was introduced, following some criticism made to the existing models at that time, 
in the sense that they were used by banks to smoothen their profits throughout the cycle 
[see, among others, liu and ryan (2006), and fonseca and González (2008)]. under this 
perspective, banks were arguably using their expected credit loss models in a 
countercyclical manner, by recognising higher credit losses in good times which they 
would then not need to recognise in downturns. incurred loss approaches were introduced 
to bring these practices to an end, with the requirement to recognise credit losses only 
when an effective loss event occurred.
However, the global financial crisis brought to the light the limitations of the incurred loss 
approach, summarised in the sentence “too little, too late”. indeed, the recognition of 
credit losses was generally lower and less timely than it should have been, with additional 
evidence suggesting that delay in recognition was positively related to excessive risk-
taking [see vyas (2011), and  Huizinga and laeven (2012)]. in the first weeks of the global 
financial crisis, while banks should have been recognising significant losses from their 
credit exposures, they were actually generating profits, which were subsequently 
distributed to shareholders and managers in the form of dividends and bonuses, 
respectively.
Abstract
1 Introduction
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in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the G20 required accounting standard setters 
worldwide to define approaches to recognise credit losses which would be more forward-
looking, incorporating more information about the macroeconomic environment, than the 
prevailing incurred loss approach [see G20 (2009)]. in other words, the G20 was calling for 
the adoption of expected credit loss approaches for the computation of credit losses.
afterwards, the world two main accounting standard setters, the international accounting 
standard Board (iasB) and the financial accounting standard Board (fasB), from the us, 
tried to design a unified approach to the recognition of credit losses. However, in 2014, 
they saw that they had significant differences and decided to separately meet the mandate 
given by the G20. these differences refer mainly to the weight traditionally given to 
prudential arguments in the definition of accounting standards and to the prevailing 
business models in europe and in the us.1 the final standards fulfilling the mandate from 
the G20 are the asC 326, issued by the fasB in June 2016, and ifrs 9, issued by the 
iasB in July 2014.2 ifrs 9 was incorporated into the eu regulatory framework in november 
2016 and became mandatory from 1 January 2018 onwards.
ifrs 9 supersedes ias 39 and amends it in two fundamental areas: the criteria for the 
classification and measurement of financial assets and liabilities (which are now more 
robust), and the introduction of an expected credit loss approach for the computation of 
credit losses.3 the second of these amendments have gained particular attention in the 
last months, with several reports by european regulators [see european Banking authority 
(2016a) and (2017b), and european systemic risk Board (2017)], banking industry [see 
Barclays (2017), and BBva (2017)] and the academic community [see abad and suárez 
(2017), Cohen and edwards (2017), and krüger et al. (2018)] discussing the impact of ifrs 
9 on european banks. 
in the same line, this article discusses the financial stability implications of the expected 
credit loss approach in ifrs 9. it is organised as follows. the next section describes the 
approach in ifrs 9, while section 3 considers its impact from a financial stability 
perspective, with a particular focus on its cyclical behaviour. policy responses to that 
cyclical behaviour are discussed in section 4. section 5 concludes.
on a conceptual basis, the different approaches to accounting for credit losses do not 
change the total amount of credit losses to be recognised, but, rather on the contrary, 
affect how these credit losses are recognised over time. that leads to the decisive question 
on when credit losses should be recognised by banks: when they are expected to occur in 
the future or when they have effectively occurred. under the first approach (expected 
credit losses), even at loan inception, banks can expect future credit losses. However, that 
enters into opposition with the view according to which, if a loan is priced correctly at 
inception (via, basically, the interest rate of the loan or the collateral requirements), it 
1 the majority of us banks manage their credit exposures under an originate-to-distribute business model, which 
implies the subsequent sale of the credit exposure to a third party, meaning that the bank no longer holds the 
exposure. the global financial crisis exposed several weaknesses in this business model [see purnanandam 
(2011), and rosen (2010)], which us authorities tried to address with a number of measures, including the new 
accounting standard for credit losses.
2 see pricewaterhouse Coopers (2017) for a description of the differences between ifrs 9 and asC 326.
3 ifrs 9 also covers accounting for hedging transactions, but, in this case, the change with the previous standard 
(ias 39) is deemed to be minor in comparison with those affecting fair value measurement and credit losses 
(impairment). ifrs 9 gives the option either to continue applying the ias 39 hedge accounting requirements or 
to move to the ifrs 9 new requirements; this option does not have “sunset clause” as the discontinuation of ias 
39 accounting requirements is conditional to the finalization by the iasB of its standard setting project on 
dynamic hedging.
2  Description of the 
expected credit loss 
approach in IFRS 9
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should already reflect the credit risk of the borrower at that moment in time [see Borio and 
lowe (2001)].4 therefore, the introduction of compulsory loss allowances, based on 
expected credit losses, could lead to double-counting. 
on the other hand, at the moment of granting a loan, there is a significant degree of 
uncertainty on the soundness of the borrower, which may lead to a mispricing 
(underestimation or, in principle also possible, overestimation) of credit risk at loan 
inception. indeed when granting loans, banks are confronted with an adverse selection 
problem which has been extensively discussed in the academic literature [see stiglitz and 
weiss (1981), and Bester (1985)]. typically, banks counteract the possible overstatement 
by borrowers on their financial soundness by using (credit scoring) models and their 
expertise, as well as by recurring to external (neutral) sources of information. Besides, 
competition among banks can also lead to a loan pricing policy which departs from the 
interest rate and collateral requirements which would be perfectly tailored to the credit risk 
of the borrower [see, among others, Greenbaum et al. (1989), sharpe (1990), and degryse 
and ongena (2005)]. thus, while it is conceptually true that there may be under- and 
overestimation of credit risk at loan origination, accounting standards for the recognition 
of credit losses put more emphasis, for prudential reasons, on the latter than on the former.
the definition of three buckets in the expected credit loss approach of ifrs 9 tries to find 
a balance between the two arguments, by trying not to have a sizable double-counting at 
initial recognition and, at the same time, acknowledging the limited information on the 
borrower which banks have at the moment of granting a loan and ensuring the full 
recognition of losses due to severe deteriorations in (perceived) credit quality relative to 
the time of origination.
under ifrs 9, the allocation of credit exposures to the “three stages”5 is based on the 
relative credit risk at the reporting date and is briefly described below and in scheme 1: 
– stage 1. if credit risk has not increased significantly since origination, an entity 
shall recognise a loss allowance at an amount equal to 12-month expected 
credit losses. this amount should reflect the estimated lifetime losses derived 
from events which are possible to occur in the 12 months following the reporting 
date. interest revenues are accrued over the gross carrying amount of the 
exposure.
– stage 2. if credit risk has significantly increased and the exposure is still not 
defaulted, an entity shall recognise a loss allowance at an amount equal to 
lifetime expected credit losses. this amount should consider losses from default 
events which are possible over the life of the exposure until its maturity. interest 
revenues are accrued over the gross carrying amount of the exposure.
– stage 3. if an exposure is identified as credit-impaired, because a default event 
has already occurred, an entity shall recognise a loss allowance for an amount 
equal to full lifetime expected credit losses. this stage is equivalent, in broad 
4 in broad terms, the interest rate of an individual loan could be decomposed into the risk-free rate and a risk 
premia, to account for the risks identified in the borrower. accordingly, credit risk should be incorporated into the 
risk premia.
5 together with the general approach that allocates exposures in three credit risk categories (known as “stages”, 
although this term is never used in the standard), ifrs 9 includes also a specific approach for exposures 
purchased or originated Credit-impaired (so-called poCis).
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terms, to the impaired assets under the incurred loss model in ias 39. interest 
revenues are accrued over the (net) carrying amount (that is, the difference 
between the gross carrying amount and the loss allowance) of the exposure. 
thus, depending on the stage to which an exposure is allocated, credit losses and interest 
revenues will be calculated differently. a shift from stage 1 to stage 2 implies that the time 
horizon for the calculation of loss allowances changes from 12 months to full lifetime, while 
the basis for the accrual of interest revenues remains unchanged. if the exposure moves 
from stage 2 to stage 3, the time horizon for the calculation of loss allowances does not 
change, but the basis for the accrual of interest revenues changes from gross carrying 
amount to net carrying amount. in comparison with stage 2, the expected credit losses to 
be recognised when an exposure moves to stage 3 will most likely be larger, reflecting the 
default status of the exposure.6 therefore, in those cases where the maturity of a loan 
exceeds one year, there could be a significant “cliff effect” in the amounts recognised 
following a significant increase in credit risk. stemming from the forward-looking nature of 
the approach, this “cliff effect” is steeper when the exposure is not expected yet to become 
defaulted but its credit risk has increased significantly since origination. it is important to 
note that the “cliff effect” from the move from stage 2 to stage 3 is expected to be smaller 
than the one which arises when applying incurred loss approaches (like that in ias 39).
for the estimation of expected credit losses, ifrs 9 requires banks to use a broad range 
of relevant information, including forward-looking macroeconomic variables. to implement 
these requirements, banks are typically considering several macroeconomic scenarios, 
which are weighted in terms of their probabilities. the use of macroeconomic variables 
directly responds to the mandate from the G20 and is one of the main factors to address 
6 in stage 3, the expected credit losses of the exposure should be calculated assuming a probability of default 
equal to 1 (as the exposure has effectively defaulted), while, when computing the expected credit losses in 
stage 2, it would be assumed that probabilities of default would be lower than 1.
THREE-STAGE APPROACH IN THE EXPECTED CREDIT LOSS APPROACH OF IFRS 9 SCHEME 1
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SOURCE: Own elaboration.
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the delayed recognition of credit losses under incurred loss approaches. indeed, while the 
incurred loss approach was basically considering past information (for example, missed 
payments or unemployment of the borrower), the expected credit loss approach in ifrs 9 
should lead to an earlier recognition of credit losses, as, typically, missed payments arise 
after a deterioration in the macroeconomic conditions (for example, an expected rise in the 
unemployment rate in the region where the borrower is employed).
in those cases where credit risk is not identifiable on individual exposures, ifrs 9 allows 
for the assessment of credit risk on a collective basis. Credit exposures can be then 
grouped together based on ratings at inception, collateral type, remaining time to maturity, 
location of the borrower, sector of the borrower or other relevant factors. therefore, if a 
significant increase in credit risk is found, an entity must recognise lifetime expected credit 
losses on that group of exposures. for the collective estimations, banks typically use a 
pd/lGd approach in which the expected loss is the product of the exposure at default 
(ead), the probability of default (pd) and the loss given default (lGd).
when calculating expected credit losses, ifrs 9 calls for the use of reasonable and 
supportable information that is available and relevant at the reporting date; including 
information about past events, current conditions, and forecast of future economic 
conditions. Historical information shall be adjusted to remove the effect of the conditions 
that are no longer relevant. these requirements generally result in point-in-time (pit) 
estimates of pds and lGds. this methodology provides a more faithful representation of 
the credit risk at a given date, but, on the other hand, given the short-term fluctuations in the 
relevant aggregate conditions, can lead to some volatility in the final outcome and to 
excessive sensitivity of credit losses (impairment allowances) to the business cycle. 
Contrary to the requirement in ifrs 9, the internal-ratings based (irB) approach for the 
calculation of the capital requirements for credit risk requires the use of through-the-cycle 
(ttC) methodologies and downturn lGds, which are arguably generating a less volatile 
outcome. in this sense, ifrs 9 intends to produce an unbiased estimation of expected 
credit losses which can provide useful and faithful information to users of financial 
statements, while the regulatory requirements take an approach closer to prudential 
objectives.
in line with the mandate given by the G20 to global accounting standard setters in 2009, 
the implementation of the expected credit loss approach in ifrs 9 aims at achieving a 
fuller and timelier recognition of credit losses than under incurred loss approaches. 
Conceptually, an expected credit loss approach should not increase the total amount of 
credit losses to be recognised in a downturn, but should change how these losses are 
distributed over time, tending to recognise a large portion of them at the beginning of the 
downturn. a delayed recognition of expected credit losses has typically been associated 
with a negative effect on financial stability [see laeven and majnoni (2003), Beatty and 
liao (2011), and Bushman and williams (2015)]. indeed, macroeconomic variables, which 
ultimately determine credit losses, start to deteriorate before payments are starting to 
become due. the period of time between the deterioration in the macroeconomic 
conditions and the effective missed payments could be used by banks to anticipate their 
credit losses, enhancing their loss-absorbing capacity in downturns and ensuring a 
smooth provision of credit to the real economy afterwards. 
in general terms, the expected credit loss approach in ifrs 9 will likely and substantially 
improve the timeliness and size of credit loss recognition, bringing important benefits from 
a financial stability point of view [see european systemic risk Board (2017)]. there are, 
3  Assessment of the 
expected credit loss 
approach in IFRS 9
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nonetheless, some aspects of it which deserve a more detailed discussion from a financial 
stability perspective. the following subsections are devoted to it.
one key aspect of the expected credit loss approach in ifrs 9 relates to the ability of 
banks to anticipate the downturn enough in advance. this will determine how credit losses 
are effectively distributed over time when the downturn arrives. Here, existing evidence 
from the recent global financial crisis invites us to be cautious. indeed, as shown by 
Chart 1, the macroeconomic projections just at the onset of the global financial crisis (April 
2008) of the imf world economic outlook failed substantially to anticipate what was about 
to come. while a certain deceleration in Gdp growth could be anticipated at that time, 
these projections missed the severity of the global financial crisis which was going to 
unravel in the following weeks. forecasts issued by other public and private institutions 
around the same period also performed poorly. similarly, Chart 2 shows the evolution of 
the “anxious index”, developed by the federal reserve Bank of philadelphia, which 
represents the probability attributed by a panel of professional forecasters to a decrease 
in real Gdp in the us. it can be seen how professional forecasters typically start to consider 
3.1  antiCipation of 
downturns and 
modellinG risks
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a recession in their forecasts when the economy is already in a recession, demonstrating a 
very limited capacity to anticipate downturns. with this in mind, it is necessary to be 
realistic in what the expected credit loss models can achieve in terms of anticipating 
downturns and any anticipation beyond 12 months should not be expected, in the most 
optimistic scenario.
at the same time, existing evidence points to the fact that, in jurisdictions where other 
expected credit loss approaches have been in place together with incurred loss approaches, 
banks tend to be already aware of their limited capabilities to anticipate future downturns 
and, consequently, usually take a very conservative approach in their credit loss estimates. 
typically, it means that banks increase provisions in anticipation of future lending growth 
and maintain voluntary capital buffers to build resilience against future losses [see 
Cummings and durrani (2016) for an analysis based on the regulatory and accounting 
regime for australian banks]. However, the degree to which this behaviour can be replicated 
in a situation where both the regulatory and accounting regimes are under expected credit 
loss approaches remains unknown.
in addition to the limited predictive power of expected credit loss models, they also 
introduce a degree of modelling risk and complexity. The modelling requirements in IFRS 9 
imply the use of several alternative macroeconomic scenarios, which must be weighted 
depending on the attributed probabilities of materialisation. when such models are 
implemented over the banking book of banks of a larger size, the number of variables and 
data points included in them introduces a sizable layer of complexity in the process. 
indeed, modelling risk, understood to be the uncertainty about the outcomes of the models 
under certain extreme conditions, must be closely controlled and monitored by banks and 
supervisors, to avoid undesirable outcomes at times of financial stress, precisely when 
their accuracy is more necessary.
disclosure seems a powerful available tool to mitigate modelling risk and complexity in 
expected credit loss models. it could be convenient to define a set of harmonised 
disclosures for the models used by banks for their expected credit loss estimations. this 
should allow cross-sectional comparisons of the different parameters of their models, 
disclosing important information to financial market participants. on that basis, some 
modelling practices could be used as benchmarks and outliers could be identified. in the 
past, the enhanced disclosure task force (edtf) under the aegis of the financial stability 
Board was effective in promoting meaningful disclosures among banks. a similar initiative, 
either at global or european level, could be mandated with the task of defining disclosures 
related to expected credit loss models. rather than adding more pages to (already lengthy 
and complex) financial statements, these new disclosures should take the form of 
predefined standardised templates or databases, which should ideally be published in a 
centralised way.7 
additionally and in relation to the complexity of the models used by banks to calculate 
their expected credit losses, it would be important that competent authorities make a call 
for simple models, against more complex approaches. that would be particularly relevant 
for smaller banks, which may not have the appropriate skills to engage in such an intense 
modelling activity. to support this call for simplicity, academic evidence points to the fact 
7 for example, by a central warehouse, managed by either a global or european institution, or a banking 
association.
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that complex approaches do not typically outperform simpler solutions [see, among 
others, estrella and mishkin (1998)].
when assessing the expected credit loss approach in ifrs 9 from a financial stability 
perspective, a crucial aspect refers to its potential procyclical behaviour. the following 
paragraphs will discuss the possible procyclical behaviour of ifrs 9 derived from the 
increase in stage 3 exposures in a downturn, the transfer of exposures from stage 1 to 
stage 2, and the use of pds and lGds in expected credit loss models. However, before 
entering into further details, it is worth to take a step backwards and to reflect on the 
concept of procyclicality and its relation with credit losses.
in this regard, a first question to be answered relates to the definition of procyclicality. an 
initial attempt would refer to the fact that some variables move together with the cycle, 
standing in clear opposition to countercyclical variables, which move in the opposite 
direction. therefore, the following could be a valid definition of procyclicality: “[…] strictly 
speaking, procyclicality refers to the tendency of financial variables to fluctuate around a 
trend during the economic cycle […]” [see landau (2009)]. it is, nonetheless, possible to 
go a bit further and consider that the concept of procyclicality incorporates an amplification 
of the cyclical movements, in the sense that procyclical variables somehow exceed and 
reinforce the cycle. defining procyclicality like “[…] the mutually reinforcing (“positive 
feedback”) mechanisms through which the financial system can amplify business 
fluctuations and possibly cause or exacerbate financial instability […]” [see financial 
stability forum (2008)] would then be more accurate.
second, it is necessary to consider whether procyclicality per se is harmful for financial 
stability. Here, it can be argued that procyclicality becomes a concern from a financial 
stability point of view if it is created within the financial system and does not reflect the 
dynamics of the real economy [see landau (2009)]. so, it can be taken from this statement 
that procyclicality per se is not always detrimental for financial stability. indeed, looking 
beyond expected credit loss models, many variables in the real economy show a significant 
degree of procyclicality and that is assumed to be intrinsic to its nature (for example, sales 
of luxury cars). 
Going back to credit losses, it has been well documented in the existing literature that 
there is a direct relation between the evolution of an economy over the cycle (measured 
typically through the gross domestic product) and credit losses (measured as non-
performing loans) [see Beck et al. (2013) for a recent contribution to the topic]. therefore, 
by its own nature, there will be always some procyclical behaviour of credit losses, as they 
would be higher in downturns and lower in upturns. the fact that the expected credit loss 
approach in ifrs 9 produces procyclical credit losses should not be regarded as a negative 
feature of the standard itself, insofar procyclicality follows the evolution of the real economy. 
a more serious concern arises if the recognition of credit losses emerging from the 
application of ifrs 9 contributes (in isolation or in combination with other factors) to 
increase the cyclicality of the real economy. 
Conceptually, under the expected credit loss approach in ifrs 9, the increase in credit 
losses at the onset of a downturn would stem from two sources. the first one would be 
closely linked to the evolution of the cycle and would likely be reflected in a significant 
increase in stage 3 exposures during downturns and in the variations in expected credit 
losses in normal times. in this case, the accounting standard would just reflect the evolution 
of the real economy, so procyclicality should not be the fundamental source of concern for 
3.2  tHe CyCliCal BeHaviour 
of tHe expeCted Credit 
loss approaCH in ifrs 9
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policymakers. the second one would imply the transfer of exposures from stage 1 to 
stage 2 (“cliff effect”), when banks consider that there has been a significant increase in 
credit risk, and could generate some undesired procyclicality if that transfer, in broad 
terms, occurs immediately before the onset of the financial crisis (in other words, if 
expected credit losses are not sufficiently anticipated).8 these two factors (anticipation of 
the downturn and trigger for significant increase in credit risk) would determine the size 
and likelihood of the “cliff effect”. while it could be argued that the concept of “significant 
increase in credit risk” is closely related to the real economy, there are, at least, two 
reasons which would justify these concerns from a financial stability perspective:
– as stated above, the capabilities of expected credit loss models to anticipate 
downturns should not be overstated, given the evidence from the recent global 
financial crisis. so, banks will most likely recognise a significant increase in 
credit risk very close to the real onset of the downturn and the amount of credit 
losses which can be effectively anticipated would then be limited.
– second, ifrs 9 provides banks with substantial discretion in the definition of 
triggers for a significant increase in credit risk and they may be confronted with 
misaligned incentives in this area. Given the negative consequences that the 
recognition of a significant increase in credit risk may have, in the short-term, 
for the profitability, capital position, share price and, ultimately, market value of 
a bank, management may be incentivised to define a high threshold in order to 
delay as much as possible this outcome (that would be similar to the evidence 
found by laeven and majnoni (2003) on the delayed recognition of impairment 
losses by banks). 
therefore, due to the lack of either forecasting capacity or incentives by banks, the majority 
of the exposures would be reclassified to stage 2 at the onset of the downturn. the “cliff 
effect” would also be affected by two important variables determining the credit portfolio 
of banks. 
the first of these variables is the maturity of credit exposures. in the extreme case of credit 
exposures with a maturity of one year or below, there will not be any “cliff effect”, since the 
lifetime expected credit losses will be the same as the 12-months expected credit losses. 
for longer maturities, the “cliff effect” is expected to be larger, reaching the extreme case 
of, for example, mortgages which typically have exposures over 20 years and which should 
go through several cycles in their lifetime. a substantial modification of the maturity of 
loans to avoid the potential costs of the “cliff effect” seems rather unlikely, as the long-
term financing of investment projects is at the core of banking business models. However, 
it cannot be excluded that banks adjust marginally the maturity of the loans they grant (in 
particular, corporate loans) or the pricing of loans with longer maturities, with the potential 
to increase refinancing risks among non-financial corporations. 
secondly, some sectors are more closely affected than others during downturns, 
being real estate a landmark example in this area [see Berman and pfleeger (1997) 
for a comprehensive discussion]. in this case, banks with borrowers in the sectors 
more sensitive to the cycle would be more affected than banks with borrowers in 
8 actually, estimates of the future evolution of the macroeconomic variables included in the expected credit loss 
models of banks will imply a certain degree of variability and procyclicality, even if there is not a transfer of 
exposures from stage 1 to stage 2 [see abad and suárez (2017) and Chae et al. (2018)].
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other sectors, as the former group of banks would witness a widespread deterioration 
of credit quality in their portfolios as the cycle also deteriorates. on the other hand, 
one benefit of the introduction of the expected credit loss model in ifrs 9 is that, in 
principle, it will make banks more aware of credit risk in their portfolios, avoiding 
concentration of exposures on sectors which may perform unfavourably in a 
downturn.
last but not least, procyclicality in the expected credit loss models according to ifrs 9 
may also arise from the use of pit pds and neutral lGds. the definition of these parameters 
in these terms ensures that they reflect as accurately as possible the evolution of the real 
economy, but they could also have undesired procyclical effects. that would be the case, 
for example, of a sizable recalibration of pds as a result of an unexpected change in the 
macroeconomic environment, which would affect all credit exposures in the balance sheet 
of banks. in this particular case and following the practical implementation of expected 
credit loss models by european banks, it is important to first gather information on how 
relevant the use of pit pds and neutral lGds is in terms of procyclical behaviour of 
expected credit loss models. 
in a situation where the expected credit loss model of an individual bank, in isolation, is not 
able to predict sufficiently in advance the downturn and that bank suffers a significant 
deterioration of its capital position derived from the credit losses it must recognise at the 
onset of a downturn, voluntary capital buffers would be the first line of defence against 
that deterioration. when they are not enough, the capital conservation buffer should, in 
principle, be able to absorb the amount of these losses, without hampering the provision 
of credit to the real economy. in these circumstances, there would be limitations to the 
distribution of dividends and bonuses, but the bank would continue to remain compliant 
with regulatory capital requirements and to function on a going concern basis. However, 
this does not automatically imply that, in these circumstances, the provision of credit to 
the real economy is not impaired.
in practice, the impact of the deterioration of the capital position of many banks can 
be more harmful for financial stability. first, banks may decide to contract credit to 
the real economy as a way to compensate the recognised credit losses, in an attempt 
to maintain stable their regulatory capital ratios. indeed, it has been widely 
documented in the academic literature that typically banks react to capital pressures 
with a reduction on assets and new lending [see, among others, Berger and udell 
(1994), peek and rosengren (1997), and mésonnier and monks (2015)]. furthermore, 
at the onset of a downturn, this phenomenon is expected to affect not only an 
individual bank, but rather the majority of banks, with different degrees of severity, in 
an economy. such scenario could create a feedback loop reinforcing the downturn, 
as the provision of credit to the real economy would be partially interrupted by banks 
ailing to maintain their capital positions, having thus a detrimental effect on financial 
stability. 
even a scenario where banks decide to consume their capital conservation buffer 
would also require some consideration from a financial stability point of view. the 
impact of a simultaneous absorption of the capital conservation buffer by a significant 
part of the banking system of an economy would, surely, negatively affect other parts 
of the financial system and financial stability, in general. in these circumstances, 
contagion to other parts of the financial system or to other countries should not be 
excluded.
3.3  reaCtion funCtion of 
Banks at tHe onset  
of a downturn
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the negative consequences of the widespread recognition of credit losses at the onset of 
a downturn would grant some reflection from a macroprudential angle. the next section 
will discuss possible policy measures to avoid such undesired outcome.
if not properly anticipated in pricing and previous reclassifications to stage 2, at the onset 
of a downturn, a material part of the credit portfolio of banks could be expected to shift 
from stage 1 to stage 2, increasing significantly the amount of credit losses to be 
recognised. these losses would add to those derived from the recognition of certain credit 
exposures as non-performing (or defaulted), under stage 3, which would just follow the 
evolution of the cycle in the real economy. Hence, at the beginning of a downturn, there 
would be a sizable increase of credit losses, with the possible effect of putting into question 
the capital position of banks.
among the range of available alternatives, when considering a policy response to that 
scenario, policymakers can decide to approach the issue by either (i) attenuating the impact 
of the credit losses on the capital position of banks, or (ii) requiring banks to hold additional 
capital buffers during good times, which they can then use to compensate for the credit 
losses when the cycle goes downwards. this decision by policymakers will define the most 
appropriate measures to be put in place. the following paragraphs will discuss in further 
detail each alternative.
policymakers can consider that they would like to ensure the flow of credit to the real 
economy, even at the onset of a downturn. one way of achieving this is by attenuating the 
impact of the credit losses derived from the expected credit loss approaches in ifrs 9 on 
the regulatory capital, through prudential adjustments.
typically, prudential regulators have defined prudential adjustments when they have 
considered that the treatment of certain items in the accounting realm was not fully 
compatible with the prudential objectives of prudential regulation. these are adjustments 
where the microprudential authorities introduce a conservative bias in terms of the impact 
of certain items on the regulatory capital position of banks. the most prominent example 
is provided by fair value gains and losses, which until recently were recognised in the profit 
and loss account of banks but were filtered out in the computation of the capital 
requirements [see european Banking authority (2013)]. Cash flow hedging is an example 
of the items currently subject to prudential adjustments. at the conceptual level, 
nonetheless, a prudential adjustment to address the cyclical behaviour of the expected 
credit loss approach in ifrs 9 could be perceived as less conservative than existing 
prudential adjustments, since it would imply a “relaxation” of the capital requirements in a 
downturn. from a macroprudential perspective, though, such adjustment would be 
conservative as it would be aimed at avoiding a contraction of credit to the real economy 
(a typical objective in macroprudential policy). 
in the current regulatory framework, prudential adjustments have been defined to 
address the differences between the accounting (calculated under ifrs 9 as of 1 
January 2018) and the regulatory provisions (calculated according to the framework 
by the Basel Committee on Banking supervision). regarding regulatory provisions, 
for banks following standardised approaches, general provisions are not considered 
when computing the amount of the exposure to which standardised risk weights will 
be applied, but specific provisions are. General provisions can be later added back as 
tier 2 capital, with a limit of 1.25% of the credit risk-weighted assets of the bank. in 
this case, the relevant question to answer is whether ifrs 9 impairments can qualify 
4  Discussion of policy 
responses to the 
procyclicality of the 
expected credit loss 
approach in IFRS 9
4.1  attenuatinG tHe impaCt 
of Credit losses  
on Capital
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as generic provisions or are always considered as specific provisions [see european 
Banking authority (2017a), stating that all ifrs 9 provisions shall be considered 
specific]. the internal-ratings Based (irB) approach already envisages an expected 
credit loss model for the computation of credit losses, although different to that 
defined in ifrs 9 (see table 1 for a summarised description of the main differences). 
in the case of the regulatory regime, credit losses are computed always over a 12 
month horizon, pds are partially computed ttC and lGds are defined with a negative 
bias (downturn lGds). differences between the accounting and the regulatory 
provisions are treated asymmetrically, in the sense that, when the regulatory provisions 
are larger than the accounting provisions, the shortfall is deducted from Cet 1 capital, 
while, when regulatory provisions are lower than accounting provisions, banks can 
add back the excess accounting provisions as tier 2 capital, with a limit of 0.6% of 
credit risk-weighted assets. 
in the case of irB approaches, a theoretical comparison between the accounting and 
the regulatory regime may provide interesting insights. in normal times, when most of 
exposures should be allocated to stage 1 in the expected credit loss model of ifrs 9, 
regulatory provisions are expected to be larger than accounting provisions, on the 
basis of the higher regulatory lGds (downturn in opposition to unbiased) and higher 
pds (ttC pds should be higher than pit pds in that phase of the cycle). therefore, 
banks would recognise a deduction in their Cet1 capital on this basis. on the contrary, 
when the cycle turns downwards and many exposures are allocated to stages 2 and 3 
in expected credit loss models, accounting provisions would exceed regulatory 
provisions (expected credit losses would be calculated over a full lifetime horizon and 
pit pds should, in this phase of the cycle, be larger than ttC pds). Consequently, at 
this stage, the difference between accounting and regulatory provisions would be 
added back to tier 2 capital.
against this background, policymakers could consider the amendment of the existing 
prudential adjustments to adjust to the paradigm shift in the accounting realm. indeed, the 
current prudential regime was defined at a time when accounting standards were mainly 
using incurred loss models for the recognition of credit losses. that would be particularly 
the case of the regime for the standardised approach, which may require a considerable 
)BSAI( 9 SRFI)SBCB( hcaorppA desaB-sgnitaR lanretnI
Lifetime vs 12 month Rating system and associated PDs are based 
on a 12 month horizon
Stage 1 allowances are based on a 12 month 
horizon. Stage 2 and stage 3 allowances 
are based on lifetime expected losses
Point-in-time (PIT) vs 
Through-the-cycle (TTC)
Models are generally developed using an hybrid 
approach (considering cyclical and non-cyclical 
variables) which determines the rating. Ratings 
are then calibrated to a PD which may be 
somewhere between PIT and TTC
Expected losses should reflect current conditions: 
it requires a PIT adjustment
 %30.0 ta roolf a sah DP yrotaluger ehTroolF
for all exposures except sovereign counterparties
No floor on the PD
etamitse TIP ,desaibnU)DGL nrutnwod( etamitse evitavresnoCsDGL
 laicnanif emit yreve ,tsael ta( sisab suounitnoClaunnAsetamitse fo ycneuqerF
statements are prepared)
COMPARISON OF EXPECTED CREDIT LOSS APPROACHES IN IFRS 9 AND IN PRUDENTIAL REGULATION TABLE 1
SOURCE: European Systemic Risk Board (2017).
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revision [see Basel Committee on Banking supervision (2016) and european systemic 
risk Board (2017)].
nonetheless, while, in principle, the amendment of the existing prudential adjustments to 
attenuate the impact of credit losses on regulatory capital at the onset of a downturn may 
seem an adequate policy response, there are two important reasons which would advise 
against it.
first and foremost, the filtering of credit losses in the capital position of banks could be 
perceived as a weakening of the mandate given by the G20 in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, leading ultimately to the recognition of credit losses “too little, too late”, as 
in the past. indeed, such prudential adjustments could, at the extreme, insulate the capital 
position of banks from credit losses, sending a misleading signal to financial market 
participants and to the public opinion at large.
even if this strong argument did not deter policymakers for pursuing this avenue of work, 
a second reason calling for not implementing prudential adjustments would be 
complexity. there are already many voices stating that there is too much complexity in 
the banking system and, in particular, in banking regulation [see, among others, Haldane 
and madouros (2012)]. in that context, defining a prudential adjustment which is not 
perceived as circumventing the mandate given by the G20 and which takes into account 
the particularities of the credit portfolio of banks is likely to lead to a solution of increased 
complexity. on a related topic, the recently approved transitory arrangements for ifrs 9 
provide an illustrative example in this regard [see Council of the eu (2017)]. despite the 
call for simplicity by, among others, the european Banking authority [see european 
Banking authority (2017a)], the final text of the amendment in the Capital requirement 
regulation (Crr) is really complex and many market participants predict that, in practice, 
banks will ignore them in favour of a direct absorption of the expected credit losses in 
ifrs 9 (similarly to what happened with the transitory arrangements of Basel iii). to sum 
up, the definition of permanent prudential adjustments needed to reduce the procyclical 
effects of the expected credit loss approach in ifrs 9 might be particularly difficult and 
cumbersome, increasing the complexity already inherent in the expected credit loss 
approach of ifrs 9.
as an alternative to the attenuation of the procyclical capital impact of the impairment 
losses stemming from the expected credit loss approach, policymakers can decide to 
strengthen the capital of banks in good times, in order to prepare them for the substantial 
hit they will get at the onset of the next downturn. in this case, policymakers know that 
they cannot avoid the impact on the capital position of banks and simply prepare banks in 
advance, so that they can absorb that impact when it occurs. the nature of this policy 
would be countercyclical: calling for a strengthening of the capital ratios of banks in good 
times and accepting a decrease in capital ratios in periods of crisis.
in this sense, supervisory stress tests become important tools for micro and 
macroprudential authorities, as they allow them to assess the level of capitalisation of 
the banking sector and how it could absorb the related credit losses created in a 
hypothetical downturn. on the basis of the results of the supervisory stress tests, 
prudential authorities could consider individual or system-wide increases of the 
regulatory capital requirements of banks. to that end, ensuring a faithful and rigorous 
implementation of supervisory stress tests, including the definition of adverse scenarios, 
is of the utmost importance.
4.2  inCreasinG resilienCe 
of Banks
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among the new capital buffers introduced in Basel iii, two of them are particularly relevant 
for these purposes: the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) and the capital conservation 
buffer (CCB) [see european Banking authority (2016b) for a detailed discussion on them].
indeed, policymakers (macroprudential authorities in this case) could decide to actively 
use the CCyB, ensuring that banks build enough buffers to help them absorb losses 
without impairing the provision of credit to the real economy, when the downturn arises 
and the regulatory buffer is released. while the primary objective of the CCyB is to protect 
the banking sector against the consequences of excessive credit growth, it is acknowledged 
that, in downturns, the release of the CCyB should help to reduce the risk that the supply 
of credit is negatively affected by regulatory capital requirements, a fact which could 
ultimately hamper the real economy. 
the current framework for the CCyB gives a prominent role to the credit-to-Gdp gap for 
the activation and release of this tool [see Basel Committee on Banking supervision 
(2010)], but, at least, in the eu, allows for the consideration of other variables [see european 
systemic risk Board, 2014]. in this respect, recent decisions by macroprudential authorities 
in the united kingdom, lithuania and denmark to build up the buffer above 0%, even 
when the credit-to-Gdp gap remains negative, may hint at a certain shift in the approach 
by macroprudential authorities towards the CCyB [see financial policy Committee (2016), 
lietuvos Bankas (2017) and danmarks nationalbank (2017)]. in addition to some statistical 
undesired properties of the credit-to-Gdp gap [see, among others, lang and welz (2016)], 
some macroprudential authorities want to have the possibility to release a capital buffer in 
case a downturn comes unexpectedly and, consequently, have started to require the 
build-up of the CCyB before getting a signal from the credit-to-Gdp gap in that direction.
in what regards the CCB, this is a capital buffer which is fixed at 2.5% of Common equity 
tier 1 capital and which breach introduces limitations to the distribution of dividends and 
bonuses, while keeping the bank as a going concern. differently to the CCyB (which 
applies to all banks in a country and is under the control of the macroprudential authority 
in that country), the CCB works as an “automatic stabiliser” in the sense that it does not 
need a formal decision by any prudential authority for its release. it should then act as a 
first line of defence in case of significant erosion of the capital position of banks. in the 
context of the expected credit loss approach in ifrs 9, at the onset of a downturn, it is 
expected that several banks would simultaneously see a material deterioration of their 
CCB [see, for example, the results of the model by abad and suárez (2017)]. to avoid that 
banks cut lending rather than to breach their CCB (an action for which the management of 
a bank does not have any incentive), it is of the essence that microprudential supervisors 
make clear their expectation in what concerns the nature of the CCB and how it should 
evolve along the cycle. at the present moment, there is a widespread view in the financial 
markets that capital buffers constitute hard capital, putting pressure on banks not to 
release them (in line with the so-called “regulatory paradox”).9 that goes against the very 
nature of the CCB, which is precisely defined with the primary objective of being released 
in downturns, when banks realise substantial losses, allowing them to continue as a going 
concern and ensuring the provision of credit to the real economy.
9 the paradox has often been attributed to British economist Charles Goodhart: “the weary traveller who arrives 
at the railway station late at night, and, to his delight, sees a taxi there who could take him to his distant 
destination. He hails the taxi, but the taxi driver replies that he cannot take him, since local bylaws require that 
there must always be one taxi standing ready at the station”.
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the global financial crisis unveiled the limitations of incurred loss approaches for the 
recognition of bank credit losses. following the mandate from the G20, there has been a 
move, on a global scale, to expected credit loss approaches, which are likely going to lead 
to an earlier recognition of credit losses in downturns. since 1 January 2018, ifrs 9 
defines the expected credit loss model which european banks must follow in the recognition 
of credit losses.
while the move from incurred loss approaches to expected credit loss approaches brings 
substantial benefits from a financial stability point of view (derived from the timelier and 
fuller recognition of credit losses), several aspects of the expected credit loss approaches 
could have a sizable effect on financial stability and, thus, would call for the consideration 
of policy options in the prudential area. the paradigm shift in the accounting domain 
should ideally lead to a reflection on the regulatory and prudential domain.
under perfect foresight of future macroeconomic conditions, it is clear that the recognition 
of credit losses under ifrs 9 would occur in a less cyclical manner than in the past. 
However, the capability of any model to forecast future macroeconomic developments 
was severely put into question in the global financial crisis. this may explain, at least 
partially, for example, the reconsideration of the use of models for regulatory capital 
requirements (with the introduction of output floors or the compulsory treatment of certain 
exposures under the standardised approach).
therefore, policymakers should consider that ifrs 9 is not going to be applied in a world 
of perfect foresight, but, rather on the contrary, that expected credit loss models will be 
able to anticipate downturns only shortly before their occurrence. at the onset, there would 
be a significant increase in credit losses, which is expected to have negative effects on the 
profit and loss account of banks and, subsequently, on their regulatory capital position. in 
turn, banks may react, on a collective way, to this negative impact on their regulatory 
capital by reducing lending, since they may not be able to raise fresh capital at that 
moment, when they are in a downturn, and they may not be willing to release their CCB. 
this situation would justify the attention of macroprudential authorities, if macroprudential 
policy is conceptualised as “an effort to control the social costs associated with excessive 
balance sheet shrinkage on the part of multiple financial institutions hit with a common 
shock” [see Hanson et al. (2011)].
this undesired procyclicality may be attenuated by a robust implementation of the 
expected credit loss model in ifrs 9. in particular, high thresholds for a significant increase 
in credit risk, which would enlarge the “cliff effect” when exposures move from stage 1 to 
stage 2 should be avoided.10
in this regard, supervisory stress tests, if rigorously implemented, should provide important 
insights to micro and macroprudential authorities in their assessment of the level of 
capitalisation of the banking system and how banks would be able to absorb the credit 
losses emerging in a downturn, accounted for under the expected credit loss approach in 
ifrs 9. moreover, it may seem necessary from a financial stability point of view to 
implement policies oriented towards increasing resilience of banks, via, for example, 
setting a CCyB above 0% in normal times, and clarifying that cyclical capital buffers (CCyB 
but also CCB) are expected to be released when the cyclical evolution of the economy 
10 in extreme circumstances, this would entail a direct transfer from stage 1 to stage 3, since stage 2 exposures 
would be very near to stage 3 exposures.
5 Conclusions
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 98 REVISTA DE ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 34
requires so and the CCB is expected to be consumed, at least partly, in response to 
potentially negative profits. at the same time, there should be a call for simplicity in the 
models and the enhancement and harmonisation of the information disclosed by banks to 
the public, as a mean to promote market discipline and benchmarking of modelling 
practices across the eu banking system.
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